Communist China – Part 8

Possible China scenarios.

In this essay series we’ve been using Arthur Kroeber’s China’s Economy: What Everyone Needs to Know, Michael Pillsbury’s The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower, Chris Miller’s Chip War: The Fight for the World’s Most Critical Technology, and Elbridge Colby’s The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict, to help explain the importance of China in the world today. In this essay, we’ll focus on Colby and Pillsbury’s recommendation for U.S. strategy regarding China, as well as Kroeber’s outline of possible future China scenarios.

Colby writes:

How should the United States orient itself ..? The fundamental reality is that there are now structural limitations on what the United States can do—it cannot do everything at once. Thus it must make hard choices. And with hard choices, a framework for making them—a strategy—is crucial. Strategy, in this sense, is like any good theory meant to help explain the world—it should be as simple as possible, but no simpler. Without such a logic, there is no coherent way to discern what is truly important and needs to be specially prepared for versus what can be managed or ignored. In the situation of scarce resources in which the United States now finds itself, this is a recipe for frustration or disaster … Success for the strategy in this book would be precisely this result: a situation in which the threat of war is not salient. But attaining this goal, paradoxically, requires a clear and rigorous focus on war. Readers will not find here any discussion of how to compete with China economically, how most international institutions should evolve, or any number of other problems in international politics. This is not because these are not important issues—they are—but because if Americans do not have the right defense strategy, these other considerations and interests will be forced to take a backseat. Figuring out that strategy is the task of this book … The top priority for the US defense establishment should be ensuring that China cannot subordinate a US ally or quasi-ally in Asia, with the first priority being developing and maintaining the ability to conduct a denial defense of Taiwan … Taiwan as the Initial Target Taiwan is the most attractive target for China’s focused and sequential strategy for several reasons. The first is related to China’s own interest in it. For decades, the Chinese Communist Party has made clear that “reunification” with Taiwan is a national imperative. Xi Jinping himself has described this goal as “essential to realizing national rejuvenation.” But Taiwan is also an attractive target because of its importance to Washington’s differentiated credibility. That is, even though Taiwan is not a full-fledged US ally, nervous regional states are unlikely to see its fate as materially different from that which would befall full-fledged US allies in similar circumstances. Indeed, these actors, wondering about US differentiated credibility, are more likely to regard Taiwan as a canary in the coal mine than as a bird of a different feather. As noted previously, the United States does have formalized commitments relating to Taiwan, especially the Taiwan Relations Act, and it has made a number of less formal commitments and statements, such as the Six Assurances. Perhaps as tellingly, Washington has demonstrated by its behavior that it is prepared to help defend Taiwan, as when the United States used its fleet to deter Chinese assertiveness during the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995–1996. And the defense of Taiwan has long been a point of concentration for American military planning. As a result, the practical, quiet understanding in Asia—an understanding that Washington itself has cultivated—has long been that the United States would come to Taiwan’s defense. As a consequence, even if Taiwan is not a full-fledged ally of the United States, America’s refusal to defend it would markedly undermine its differentiated credibility in Asia vis-à-vis China … Taiwan is an appealing target for military reasons as well. Taiwan is located close to China’s centers of military power. At the same time, China dwarfs Taiwan in military strength and has deliberately developed its military to be able to attack the island. Beijing has also specifically developed its military to be able to ideally block and at least markedly raise the costs and risks to the United States of intervening to defend Taiwan. In addition, Taiwan tends to act as a cork in China’s ability to project military power beyond it. If China left Taiwan alone and sought to attack states farther into the Western Pacific, it would leave its military power projection efforts exposed should Taiwan oppose it or enable other states to use its territory or air and sea space to do so. Subordinating Taiwan would remove this threat; it would also provide Beijing with additional bases both for denying other states access into the Western Pacific and East Asia and projecting power beyond the first island chain.

Pillsbury’s prognosis is as follows:

[T]he United States can adapt a few Chinese concepts from the Warring States era to beat China at its own game. STEP 1—RECOGNIZE THE PROBLEM. It has been foolish to accept stories about China’s overwhelming obstacles to growth only to discover that China’s economy has tripled in size between 1997 and 2007 alone,1 just as it has been foolish to accept repeated assurances by Beijing that it will support freer trade, move to combat intellectual property theft, and end its currency manipulation practices. It has also been foolish to be told repeatedly by Chinese leaders that China seeks a partnership with America and to ignore that the government sanctions and encourages America’s demonization, just as it has been foolish to be promised assistance against North Korea and Iran and to later learn that both regimes are sustained and supported by Beijing. STEP 2—KEEP TRACK OF YOUR GIFTS. Every year, a small fortune of American tax dollars is being spent to aid China’s rise. Most of this aid is kept low-profile, unnoticed by the media and the public. This is done intentionally. Testifying before Congress in 2005, a State Department official disclosed many of the unknown ways America is aiding China. He discussed the many Labor Department experts who the U.S. government had sent to China to boost Chinese productivity. He talked about the support that the Treasury Department and the comptroller of the currency offered China to improve its banking practices. He outlined the Federal Aviation Administration’s assistance to Chinese aircraft manufacturers. And he documented how other U.S. government agencies have facilitated hundreds of science assistance programs in China. After the hearing, the diplomat took me aside. Knowing of my background in Sino-American relations as well as my position as a congressional staff member, he asked, “Can you make this annual testimony requirement go away?” I wondered why he wanted to be excused from future testimony. “The more you get this out, the better known it will become and the more likely congressional critics of China will try to eliminate it,” he said. “Such cuts will set back our relations with China three decades.” There is still no available accounting of all the activities funded by the U.S. government to aid China. Not only is America funding its own chief opponent; it doesn’t even keep track of how much is being spent to do it. STEP 3—MEASURE COMPETITIVENESS. The U.S. government should be conducting a similar—but more robust—measure of American competitiveness. The White House should provide Congress with an annual report that includes trends and forecasts about how the United States is faring relative to its chief rivals. Many departments of the U.S. government, including the intelligence community, would have to be involved. It need not cover all other nations, just the top ten—beginning with China. STEP 4—DEVELOP A COMPETITIVENESS STRATEGY. Kent Hughes, the director of the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Program on America and the Global Economy and the former president of the Council on Competitiveness, compares the challenge posed by China’s technological rise to the Soviet launch of the Sputnik satellite in 1957. He notes that while the launch was viewed as a challenge to America’s technological and military dominance, it also spurred U.S. investment in its engineering and science education and private sector innovation. China’s rise has yet to stimulate a similarly robust response. Hughes has put forward a number of promising policy proposals to remain competitive. These include … technological innovation; the creation of a lifelong learning culture;3 and increased U.S. civilian research and development. Similarly, Ralph Gomory of New York University, a former vice president at IBM, suggests countering China’s “massive government subsidies of land, energy and technology, in addition to low- or no-cost loans” by promoting a “real manufacturing renaissance in America.” STEP 5—FIND COMMON GROUND AT HOME. Since at least 1995, Chinese scholars in Beijing have delighted in telling me stories of how Americans who criticize U.S. policy toward China are so divided by their political differences that they never cooperate. A grand coalition should be formed in the United States with the common mission of bringing change to China and altering a harmful and outdated U.S. approach to promoting reform in Beijing. This means that Americans who champion the Dalai Lama should ally with U.S. defense experts who promote spending for the Pentagon’s AirSea Battle program. It means human rights advocates should work with American businesses demanding protection of intellectual property … STEP 6—BUILD A VERTICAL COALITION OF NATIONS. Whether you play wei qi or not, you know that encirclement by a group of adversaries is dangerous. China’s natural fear is that its neighbors will form such an alliance. That’s exactly what the United States should be encouraging with nations including Mongolia, South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines. Even the threat of such a coalition—through movements in that direction—might give Beijing pause and temper its bellicosity. China knows how America and its allies contained the Soviet Union. As the United States increases aid and facilitates cooperation among China’s neighbors, China’s hawks will get the blame when China feels isolated and alone in the region. STEP 7—PROTECT THE POLITICAL DISSIDENTS. Many of the soldiers on the front line of the Cold War were Soviet and Eastern European dissidents who refused to surrender to an unending future of censorship, propaganda, religious persecution, and economic enslavement. Their field marshals were men such as Václav Havel, Lech Wałesa, and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. And with their courage and passion and principles, they brought down the Soviet Union and the Iron Curtain. But they didn’t do it alone. Presidents from Truman to Reagan championed their cause. When they were imprisoned, American presidents demanded their release. When they needed money, Americans sent them funds. When they needed a platform for the free speech their regimes denied them, Americans shared their printing presses and broadcast their battles and beliefs into millions of homes through Radio Free Europe. The U.S. government should not undermine the efforts of those who might be the most effective allies in countering the Hundred-Year Marathon. STEP 8—STAND UP TO ANTI-AMERICAN COMPETITIVE CONDUCT. China is not just a source of cyber spying against the United States; it is the primary source. According to some estimates, more than 90 percent of cyber espionage incidents against America originate in China. Chinese hackers regularly infiltrate American businesses and government entities. An abridged list of victims includes Google, Booz Allen Hamilton, AT&T, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Visa, MasterCard, and the Departments of Defense, State, Homeland Security, and Energy. Hacking is central to China’s decades-long campaign to steal technologies it can’t invent and intellectual property it can’t create. A report by the Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property, led by the former director of national intelligence Dennis Blair and by the former U.S. ambassador to China Jon Huntsman, found that the theft of U.S. intellectual property likely costs the American economy more than $300 billion per year. STEP 9—IDENTIFY AND SHAME POLLUTERS. One of the more effective approaches to protecting the environment with regard to China occurred when Ambassador Huntsman authorized the U.S. embassy in Beijing to tweet the pollution levels in Beijing. Similarly, Ma Jun, the director of the Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs, a leading environmental watchdog organization in China, has compiled online maps of China’s water, air, and solid waste pollution. But is fostering greater awareness the best we can do? The United States needs to go from asking China to act in an environmentally responsible way to insisting that China do so, even if that means using far more leverage than past administrations have been willing to exert. Otherwise, China will be at a competitive economic advantage—with Washington constraining American businesses in an effort to protect the environment while China goes right on exporting its products and its pollutants at breakneck speed. STEP 10—EXPOSE CORRUPTION AND CENSORSHIP. One of the Chinese government’s greatest fears is of a free press. It knows that sunlight is a disinfectant for wrongdoing, and it is terrified of what its people would do if they knew the whole truth about Chinese leaders’ corruption, brutality, and history of lying about the United States and our democratic allies. Yet it remains a mystery why the United States doesn’t do more to fight China’s censorship and propaganda campaigns against the Chinese people. China’s major news outlets are state-owned. The responsibility for calling out corruption frequently falls on foreign reporters in China. Western media have largely risen to the challenge—pointing out instances of embezzlement, harassment of anticorruption officials, mismanagement by state-owned enterprises, tax fraud, sex scandals, targeting of foreign companies, bribery, and so on. But the government in Beijing uses its various tools to prohibit such information from reaching the Chinese people. In 2012 the Chinese government blocked Bloomberg News after it published a story on the family wealth of Xi Jinping. The implicit deal of working in China seems to be this: you may report on China’s fantastic growth, but if you start criticizing the Communist Party or its top officials you will be kicked out of the country. Chinese leaders also pressure American technology companies to censor their websites in China. Internet service providers and social media companies seeking to operate in China face a stark reality: either cooperate with the Chinese government’s censorship or be shut out of the Chinese market by the government’s blocking of their websites … [T]he U.S. government … should be pressuring the Chinese government to back off its bullying of American companies such as Wikipedia, Yahoo!, Facebook, and other media. STEP 11—SUPPORT PRODEMOCRACY REFORMERS. Much of U.S. strategy in the Cold War is not relevant—at least not yet. Calls for a new Cold War play into the hands of the hawks in China who seek to exaggerate the threat from the United States. There is no global ideological struggle, no need to create an anti-China alliance akin to the NATO alliance to contain an expanding empire. But one lesson from the Cold War that America ought to heed is reviving the support for democratic and civil society groups within China. China’s concern when it talks about a new Cold War is that the Americans will revive their Cold War–era programs that helped to subvert the Soviet Union from within by using the power of ideas. The U.S. State Department should fund more projects to promote the development of the rule of law and civil society in China, including efforts to provide legal and technical assistance, to reform criminal law, to improve legal adjudication, training for elected village officials, and to support the independence of judges. In tandem with prodemocracy initiatives, America must also get serious about promoting free-market reforms, instead of assuming that China will inevitably open its economy … [There are] intellectual traps we may fall into that will prevent recognition of the true nature of the problem. The first is premature fear of a China threat. China is not about to “rule the world,” as Martin Jacques’s 2012 book claims. China has made no progress toward establishing a worldwide military base system of U.S.-style power projection capabilities. The Chinese currency is hardly poised to replace the dollar as the global reserve currency. As David Shambaugh of George Washington University has argued, China is merely a “partial power.” The Pentagon has already initiated a major response to China in its strategic planning, prompting critics to publish articles with titles like “Who Authorized Preparations for War with China?” The second trap for critics of China is to misidentify its strategy to replace America. Although the strategy is secret, we have enough evidence to know what it is not. No serious Chinese scholar advocates the approach to conquest of Hitler or Stalin or Tojo. No ying pai hawk author ever raises a strategy of territorial expansion or global ideological domination. Instead, China’s hawks seem obsessed with books about America’s rise to world power, like Ambassador Warren Zimmerman’s First Great Triumph: How Five Americans Made Their Country a World Power. As we have seen, the Communist Party School teaches that American trade and industrial policies enabled the United States to surpass both Britain and Germany, and the classic ying pai text On Grand Strategy praises American craftiness in exploiting World War II to push aside Europe and establish the current global order in 1945.

Finally, Kroeber sets out the three most prevalent “perspectives” of the various China-watching communities:

Simplifying greatly, we may conceptualize this debate as pitting three broad perspectives against one another. One is the national-security-oriented view that China’s rise is, at the very least, a serious challenge to U.S. global leadership and to specific U.S. security interests in Asia, and perhaps even an existential threat to the U.S.-led international order. Allied to this view is the economic nationalist perspective that American prosperity is threatened by a predatory China and that the interdependence of the two economies should be reduced. The second view, grounded in economics and business, sees U.S.–China economic interdependence as beneficial for both commercial and security reasons. From this vantage point, China’s enormous and fast-growing market is an important source of future growth for American firms … The third perspective focuses on the increasingly illiberal drift of China’s political system. In this values-based view, China’s increasingly authoritarian and repressive policies at home and mounting efforts to influence public opinion and silence criticism of the CCP regime abroad represent serious threats to the core values not just of the United States but of the liberal world order more generally. A new American strategy toward China will have to accommodate, at least to some degree, the nation’s national security, commercial, and values interests. Crafting such a policy will be no easy task. The deep uncertainty over China’s long-run demographic and economic outlook, and the untapped expansive potential of the U.S. economy, not to mention the richness and robustness of the U.S.-led world order, reduce the odds that China will unseat the United States as the world’s technological, cultural, and political leader—assuming that the U.S. acts wisely to shore up its own strengths.

That concludes this essay series on communist China. After doing this series, I thought I should do a series on the history of communism around the world, especially given the uptick in support for socialist mayoral candidates in New York City and Minneapolis. So that will be the subject of the next series of essays.